27.11.2009: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARYS PARTICIPATION IN THE DECEMBER 3-4 NATO MINISTERIAL

27.11.2009: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARYS PARTICIPATION IN

THE DECEMBER 3-4 NATO MINISTERIAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000552

NOFORN

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR IVO DAALDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2019

TAGS: PREL, NATO, MOPS, MARR, MCAP, PARM, PINS, OVIP, AF,

RS, XG, BK, MW, GG, UP, KV, YI

Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) The following message for the Secretary is being

transmitted in memo format:

BEGIN TEXT

November 27, 2009

MEMORANDUM

For: Secretary Clinton

From: Ivo Daalder

Subject: Your Participation in the NATO Foreign Ministerial

Madam Secretary:

This ministerial may be one of ) if not the ) most

important of the Presidents first term. As you outlined in

your Council on Foreign Relations speech last July, a

revitalized NATO must provide us with strong and capable

partners to address issues of common concern. This

ministerial will be a critical test of whether NATO is a

reliable partner in achieving our top foreign policy

priorities, including Afghanistan, Missile Defense, and

Russia. If we can forge a consensus around our positions on

these critical issues, NATO will have demonstrated that it

remains the place where we can count on strong partners to

address common threats through concerted actions.

AFGHANISTAN

-----------

I expect Allies to provide strong political support at the

Ministerial for the Presidents decisions on Afghanistan.

Everyone is working hard to ensure they will back that

support with additional contributions of troops, trainers,

and trust funds to NATOs ISAF operation, as well as

additional development assistance and more civilian expertise.

The Secretary General has been doing his part, visiting

capitals and calling key Allies to urge them to deliver

concrete contributions. He has clearly stated that security

in Afghanistan is a NATO ) not a U.S. ) responsibility. He

has reminded Allies that they have pressed Washington for

years to work constructively with them, consulting rather

than informing, and that the Obama Administration has been

doing just that. And he has argued that, in turn, Allies

need to respond positively and concretely to our desire for

support. His message has been direct: Europe now needs to

step up and share the burden in Afghanistan or else lose

Americas confidence in NATO as a reliable partner.

You should press Allies hard on this point, stressing that

the Presidents announced contribution to the NATO effort is

substantial and that the U.S. now needs Allies to step up and

do their part. The success of NATOs mission in Afghanistan

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is at a tipping point. You should encourage nations to show

resolve by committing as much as they possibly can at NATOs

December 7 ISAF force generation conference, making clear

that we are looking for at least a brigade-equivalent of new

troop commitments as well as many more trainers. You should

also seek Allied agreement to use the February 4-5 NATO

Defense Ministerial as a final pledging conference to fill

any outstanding requirements.

You should be prepared for questions about U.S. proposals to

improve civilian coordination in Afghanistan. Allies have

made clear that any proposal that undermines UNAMAs role is

"dead on arrival." Many Allies have also been skeptical of

suggestions to dual-hat the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan as

COMISAFs civilian equivalent. In addition to concerns that

such an arrangement would undermine UNAMA, Allies note the

damaging optic of "Americanizing" the NATO effort. Allies are

realistic about UNAMAs limitations and the need to

significantly improve civilian coordination. They are

looking to you to propose a solution that strengthens civ-mil

coordination for counterinsurgency while preserving UNAMAs

role.

If Allies respond to our leadership by increasing their

contributions to Afghanistan and agreeing on how to improve

civilian coordination, NATO will have demonstrated its value

as a partner in Afghanistan.

Missile Defense

---------------

Allies have welcomed the Presidents Phased, Adaptive

Approach (PAA) to European missile defense, and we are

gaining support for the four key points emphasized by

Secretary Gates at the Bratislava Ministerial:

-- Welcoming the PAA as a valuable contribution to the

Alliances security;

-- Affirming missile defense for NATO territories and

populations as an appropriate and viable mission for the

Alliance;

-- Presenting the PAA as a U.S. national contribution in the

event NATO pursues a territorial missile defense mission; and

-- Noting that a possible expanded role for the Active

Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program

would be a key milestone toward developing territorial

missile defense for the Alliance.

In addition, we have agreed to welcome the opportunity to

cooperate with Russia on missile defense, a position many

Allies support.

France, the UK, Spain, Slovakia, and Belgium are among those

that have objected to affirming missile defense for NATO

territories and populations to be "an appropriate and viable

mission" for NATO, largely reflecting cost concerns. They do

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not want to sign up to language they believe would commit

NATO common funding for an expensive program, especially

given the ongoing international financial crisis.

You should be prepared to push back strongly on any such

objections, stressing that, given todays new security

challenges, missile defense of NATO territories and

populations is the essence of Article 5 and thus an Alliance

mission by definition. To question the appropriateness and

viability of this mission is therefore to question the very

core of the Alliance itself.

Russia

------

I am growing increasingly convinced that Russia is not

serious about its engagement with NATO. Our reset policy

assumes that Russia will reciprocate. While Moscow may be

doing so bilaterally, it clearly is not doing so at NATO,

whether by neglect or as a deliberate strategy. After months

of negotiations, Moscow instructed its mission to suspend

work on a "Way Forward" paper that would reform and

restructure the NATO-Russia Council, making it a more

effective institution. The suspension of negotiations has

exasperated the Secretary General and all Allies, even those

usually in favor of closer NATO-Russia relations. At the

same time, Russia has continued to press its own agenda,

including a potentially divisive joint assessment of threats.

Allies are clear engagement has to be a two-way street; they

have informally agreed to set aside the joint assessment

until such time as Russia is prepared to reengage

constructively on restructuring the NRC.

Despite NATOs positive outreach, Russia continues to use its

presence at NATO to try to divide the Alliance. Russias

strong push for a European Security Treaty (EST) appears

designed to undermine NATO. Moscow is also pressing hard to

conduct EST discussions within the NATO-Russia Council in an

apparent attempt to short-circuit the OSCE process, likely

hoping to avoid discussion of Russias adherence to the human

rights dimensions of the OSCEs Helsinki Final Act. While we

have resisted this forum shopping, we need a more

well-defined policy on how to respond to Russias call for an

EST, including how to protect existing European security

structures from being undermined by Moscows zero-sum efforts

to rewrite the security architecture and their international

commitments.

You should use your intervention to begin forging a shared

Allied assessment of what Moscow is up to in NATO, and then

lay the basis for a common response to Russias forthcoming

attempt to renegotiate the fundamentals of the European

security architecture. We must remain open to substantive

cooperation with Moscow on issues of common concern

(including Afghanistan, narcotics, piracy, terrorism and

missile defense), but we should be clear that the existing

European security framework (including a restructured NRC) is

perfectly adequate for such substantive engagement. Forging

an Allied consensus on these points will reaffirm the

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importance and strength of NATO as our partner in engaging

with Russia.

Strategic Concept and NATO Reform

---------------------------------

I did not pick the three issues above randomly. They are at

the heart of NATOs Strategic Concept exercise. If we get

them right, we will be well on our way to developing a new

statement of NATOs purpose and mission. Failure to agree on

these core issues, however, will likely signal future

difficulties in agreeing on a meaningful new Strategic

Concept. How can NATO agree on strategy if, for example, it

is unable to achieve a common understanding on Russia? I

have worked closely with Madeleine Albright on these issues,

and she is determined to address them forcefully in her final

report on the new Concept.

Finally, serious reform of NATOs processes ) how the

Alliance does business ) is absolutely essential to

achieving our substantive objectives. We need a 21st century

Alliance to face 21st century threats and challenges. You

have made this point strongly to the Secretary General last

September, and I have made it a top priority here in

Brussels. There is plenty of resistance to changing the way

the Alliance does business here, which is why I urge you to

drive home the point that this Alliance must change the way

it operates if it is to be a valuable partner in tackling the

many complex issues that we all confront in this still-young

century.

Madame Secretary, we at USNATO look forward to welcoming you

to Brussels for what will undoubtedly be a critical

ministerial meeting next week.

END TEXT

DAALDER